Over the past decade, the rapid advances and growth in deployment of service-based systems, such as the booming cloud computing systems, have had major impacts on the economy, society, and our daily lives. Today, users have grown more accustomed to accessing various online services from a wide range of computing devices, from smart phones/tablets to desktop PCs, for both business and entertainments. However, such a trend also means that more users' private and confidential information than ever is transferred processed and stored in service-based systems. This trend raises serious concerns on the trustworthiness of such systems. Substantial research has been devoted to developing new security mechanisms, network protocols, and methods to improve the trustworthiness of service-based systems. Human factors, however, have not been sufficiently addressed in the development of trustworthy service-based systems.

Human factors encompass many aspects in the development of trustworthy service-based systems, from design of trust management for trustworthy service-based systems and analysis of tradeoff between system usability and security to the evaluation of users' confidence and the usability of the deployed systems. Human factors are more important in the development of trustworthy service-based systems than traditional software systems due to more complicated interactions among various participants (infrastructure providers, service providers, application developers, and users) of service-based systems.

In this address, the current state of the art of human factors considered in the development of trustworthy service-based systems will be discussed, especially on how human factors are incorporated in improving system trustworthiness, such as the establishment and evaluation of trusts. Challenges and future research directions for human factors in the development of trustworthy service-based systems will be presented.

Stephen S, Yau is the director of Information Assurance Center and a professor of computer science and engineering at Arizona State University (ASU), Tempe, Arizona, USA. He served as the chair of the Department of Computer Science and Engineering at ASU in 1994-2001. Previously, he was on the faculties of Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, and University of Florida, Gainesville.

He served as the president of the Computer Society of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and was on the IEEE Board of Directors, and the Board of Directors of Computing Research Association. He served as the editor-in-chief of IEEE COMPUTER. He organized many national and international major conferences, including the 1989 World Computer Congress sponsored by International Federation for Information Processing (IFIP), and the Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC) sponsored by the IEEE Computer Society. His current research includes service-based systems, cloud computing, trustworthy computing, software engineering, mobile ad hoc networks and ubiquitous computing. He has received many awards and recognitions for his accomplishments, including the Tsutomu Kanai Award and Richard E. Merwin Award of the IEEE Computer Society, the IEEE Centennial Award and Third Millennium Medal, the Outstanding Contributions Award of the Chinese Computer Federation, and the Louis E. Levy Medal of the Franklin Institute. He is a Fellow of the IEEE and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. He received the M.S. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Illinois, Urbana, and the B.S. degree from National Taiwan University, Taipei, all in electrical engineering.

We argue that a general theory of trust in networks of humans and computers must be build on both a theory of behavioral trust and a theory of computational trust. This argument is motivated by increased participation of people in social networking, crowdsourcing, human computation, and socio-economic protocols, e.g., protocols modeled by trust and gift-exchange games, norms-establishing contracts, and scams/deception. User participation in these protocols relies primarily on trust, since online verification of protocol compliance is often impractical; e.g., verification can lead to undecidable problems, co-NP complete test procedures, and user inconvenience. Trust is captured by participant preferences (i.e., risk and betrayal aversion) and beliefs in the trustworthiness of other protocol participants. Both preferences and beliefs can be enhanced whenever protocol non-compliance leads to punishment of untrustworthy participants; i.e., it seems natural that betrayal aversion can be decreased and belief in trustworthiness increased by properly defined punishment. We argue that a general theory of trust should focus on the establishment of new trust relations where none were possible before. This focus would help create new economic opportunities by increasing the pool of usable services, removing cooperation barriers among users, and at the very least, taking advantage of "network effects." Hence a new theory of trust would also help focus security research in areas that promote trust-enhancement infrastructures in human and computer networks. Finally, we argue that a general theory of trust should mirror, to the largest possible extent, human expectations and mental models of trust without relying on false metaphors and analogies with the physical world.

This talk is based on joint work with Jeannette Wing.

Virgil D. Gligor received his B.Sc., M.Sc., and Ph.D. degrees from the University of California at Berkeley. He taught at the University of Maryland between 1976 and 2007, and is currently a Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering at Carnegie Mellon University and co-Director of CyLab. Over the past thirty-five years, his research interests ranged from access control mechanisms, penetration analysis, and denial-of-service protection to cryptographic protocols and applied cryptography. Gligor was an editorial board member of several IEEE and ACM journals, and the Editor in Chief of the IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing. He received the 2006 National Information Systems Security Award jointly given by NIST and NSA in the US, and the 2011 Outstanding Innovation Award given by the ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit and Control.

As network and multi-core systems are becoming pervasive, software systems also go concurrent. In a concurrent setting, in order to accomplish its computation task a program must cooperate with other programs by exchanging messages between them. These result in non-determinism and sophisticated interaction behaviour, making it very difficult to ensure that concurrent software systems will run safely and reliably

In this talk I will present an approach to checking safety properties of concurrent programs. In this approach, concurrent programs are represented as symbolic transition graphs which can be regarded as a generalization of flow chart diagrams to allow nondeterminism and communication. Safety properties are expressed as formulas in alteration-free first-order mu-calculus. An efficient algorithm exists to check whether a symbolic transition graph satisfies the desired properties. Various abstraction techniques can be incorporated to reduce the size of reachable state space.

Huimin Lin received Ph.D in Computer Science from the Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, in 1986. He is currently a research professor and the director of the State Key Laboratory of Computer Science, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences. He was elected Member of Chinese Academy of Sciences in 1999.

Prof. Lin's research interests include concurrency, model checking, modal logics, formal methods, and tools and algorithms for concurrent systems. He is in the editorial boards of Information and Computation, Theoretical Computer Science, as well as major computer science journals in China (Science in China, Journal of Computer, Journal of Software, Journal of Computer Science and Technology etc.). He serves in the Steering Committees of the International Conference on Quality Software and the Asia-Pacific Software Engineering Conference, and has been general chairs or program committee chairs of several international conferences in the area of computer science and software.

The widespread use of software systems and their ever increasing size and complexity induce many challenges to software developers and quality assurance practitioners. A fully integrated approach, based on qualitative and quantitative aspects, is needed to ensure that software dependability is correctly handled and the expected goals are reached for the final product. Dependability assessment, based on measurement, plays a vital role in software dependability improvement.

Measurement encompasses both the observation of the software behavior during its development or operational life (i.e., field measurement) and controlled experimentation (i.e., experimental measurement). Field measurement requires the collection of data related to failures, maintenance, and usage environment, in order to evaluate measures such the overall software failure rate, the failure rates according to some specific (critical) failure modes, the components failure rates, and system availability. Controlled experimentation complements very well field measurement, particularly when considering Off-The-Shelf software for which, most of the time, no information is available from the development phase.

The presentation will focus on dependability assessment, based on measurements. It will i) outline current approaches to measurement-based dependability assessment, with examples from real-life systems, and ii) identify some research gaps.

Karama Kanoun is Directeur de Recherche at LAAS-CNRS (French National Centre for Scientific Research - Laboratory for Analysis and Architecture of Systems), in charge of the Dependable Computing and Fault Tolerance Research Group (http://www.laas.fr/~kanoun/). Her research interests include modeling and evaluation of computer system dependability considering hardware as well as software, and dependability benchmarking. She has co-directed the production of a book on Dependability Benchmarking (Wiley and IEEE Computer Society, 2008).

Karama Kanoun is Chairperson of the Special Interest Group on Dependability Benchmarking of the International Federation for Information Processing (IFIP), and vice-chairperson of the IFIP working group 10.4 on Dependable Computing and Fault Tolerance. She was the principal investigator of the DBench European project (Dependability Benchmarking), and managed the European Network of Excellence ReSIST, Resilience Survivability in IST.

She is chairing the Steering Committee of the European Dependable Computing Conference (EDCC) and serving on the Steering Committees of three other conferences in her field of interest: DSN (the IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks), ISSRE (the IEEE International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering), and QRS (the IEEE International Conference on Software Security and Reliability). She has been a consultant for several French companies (including Renault-Automation, SYSECA, Aerospatiale, SAGEM, CNES, Alcatel Espace, STNA), the European Space Agency, Ansaldo Transporti, and the International Union of Telecommunications.

Licensure of certain software engineers in the United States will be required in at least 10 states by 2013 and, likely, by all US states and jurisdictions within a few years. States license engineers to ensure that those who offer services directly to the public are minimally competent. But what kinds of software systems affect the health, safety and welfare of the public? Which software engineers will need to be licensed? The answers to these two questions are both a matter of law and of science. This paper introduces some of the scientific aspects of these two questions from the perspective of reliability engineering and suggests new research directions to help answer these questions.

Recently, long running transactions attracted much research attention, because they are adopted in distributed systems, such as service-oriented systems, to ensure consistency. How to model and verify long running transactions is critical to improve the reliability of current distributed systems.

This talk will introduce our recent work on formal modeling, verification and refinement of long running transactions in terms of a process algebra language. The start point of our work is Compensating CSP (cCSP), which extends CSP for specification and verification of long running transactions. We present an extended cCSP to support the modeling of non-determinism, deadlock and livelock, which are the three basic features of concurrent systems. A full semantic theory supporting refinement for the extended language is developed based on the theory of CSP. Leveraged by our semantic theory, the verification techniques and the tools, such as FDR and PAT, can be extended for verifying long running transactions.

This talk is based on joint work with Zhenbang Chen and Zhiming Liu.

Ji Wang received his B.S., M.S. and Ph.D. in Computer Science from National University of Defense Technology. He is currently a professor in School of Computer of National University of Defense Technology, and the deputy director of National Laboratory for Parallel and Distributed Processing of China. He has been awarded National Natural Science Fund for Distinguished Young Scholars of China, and Professorship of Chang Jiang Scholars Program of Ministry of Education of China. His research interest includes formal analysis and verification of software systems, and distributed parallel computing. He has been an editorial board member of the Journal of Systems and Software, the Science China (Information Sciences), and a member of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on Software Security and Reliability.